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Abstract
Under conditions of guerrilla conflict, mass indiscriminate violence has been shown
to effectively starve a guerrilla of its support. Consequently, counter-guerrilla mass
violence is concentrated within territories where a guerrilla is dominant. However, in
roughly 40% of mass violence episodes (e.g., Rwanda and Cambodia), the violence was
aimed at populations within areas of secure territorial control. These episodes have
therefore been explained by attributing high-risk ideological preferences to leaders or
as unique cases only. I argue that leaders under conditions of heightened elite rivalry,
adopt mass indiscriminate violence against outgroup civilians to consolidate power.
The violence serves two main goals. First, it helps build coalitions with constituencies
that gain from violence. Second, it targets rival factions indirectly by undermining the
formal monopoly of violence and forcing local security officials to facilitate or oppose the
violence. The violence thereby provides rival supporters with an exit option, provides
the regime with information on rival supporters’ private loyalties, and undermines
rivals’ abilities to mount an effective resistance. These rivals can ultimately be purged
from the regime. Based on newly collected original data on elite purges and on the type
of mass indiscriminate violence for the years 1950-2004, I show that this type of mass
violence, which I call ‘genocidal consolidation,’ is intimately connected to authoritarian
consolidation.
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With the assassination of President Habyarimana, Rwanda entered one of the darkest episodes
in human history. Within the timespan of just a few months, Hutu militias meticulously
rounded up and massacred over half a million Tutsi civilians. While Tutsi life was violently
discarded, Hutu life was cheap; “reformist” Hutu elites were assassinated or forced into hid-
ing, while local Hutu officials that did not support the violence were killed. Within only two
weeks, the genocide had spread to all regions under the control of the genocidal Hutu gov-
ernment, which had assumed complete political control over the Hutu population1—despite
ultimately losing to Tutsi rebels after three and a half months of fighting.
Rwanda is not the only instance where mass violence against outgroup civilians coincided
with purges of ingroup elites. In the communist regimes of the Soviet Union, China, and
Cambodia, the motive for the violence seems completely different from Rwanda. Yet the
violent collectivization and mass killings of outgroup enemies, nonetheless, co-occurred with
purges of the highest ranking communist elites.2 This is peculiar; not only are ingroup elite
targets of purges unrelated to outgroup civilian targets of mass indiscriminate violence, but
purges and indiscriminate violence are independently risky and generate resistance from dif-
ferent parts of the population—purges invite coups from elites, while indiscriminate violence
generates armed resistance from targeted outgroups and may also invite foreign intervention
or sanctions.3 It’s not clear why leaders would take on independent risks at the same time:
why not consolidate power first, before embarking on mass violence? Problematizing the em-
pirical co-occurrence of purges and mass indiscriminate violence should help us to uncover
their dynamics.
Building on recent insights on authoritarianism, I argue that a key type of mass in-
discriminate violence is actually a rational reaction to elite rivalry; authoritarian leaders
experiencing intra-regime rivalry may adopt mass indiscriminate violence to sideline rivals
and consolidate power. Unable to target rival elites directly, leaders can couple mass indis-
1Straus 2006.
2See for example Valentino 2004; Kiernan 2008.
3See Roessler 2011; Kalyvas 2006.
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criminate violence against an outgroup with selective violence towards an ingroup to capture
local government and security structures. This in turn bolsters a leader’s support coalition
and captures or neutralizes the support base of elite challengers that can subsequently be
purged from the government. I refer to this process of mass indiscriminate violence as geno-
cidal consolidation.4
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it provides a single parsimonious
explanation for mass killings and genocides that to date have been explained by attributing
leaders with strong ideological preferences for violence5 or as unique cases only.6 Even
after 1945, genocidal consolidation alone accounts for 8-11 million (mostly civilian) deaths,
in contrast to less than 4 million battle deaths in interstate war.7 Yet, political science
research into mass indiscriminate violence trails behind research into (civil) war. While we
have a good understanding of mass indiscriminate violence within the context of irregular
counter-guerrilla operations,8 extant scholarship treats all other mass indiscriminate violence
as motivated by leader ideology.9 As an explanation, however, leader ideology is likely
incomplete and cannot explain why mass indiscriminate violence occurs during elite rivalry:
why not consolidate power first, before embarking on risky ideological ventures? This paper
introduces a novel explanation based on leader incentives for self-preservation that accounts
for this anomaly.
Second, this paper leverages newly collected data, both on mass indiscriminate violence
and on elite purges, to demonstrate one of the processes through which violence produces
private benefits for leaders. This positions the study of mass indiscriminate violence within a
wider conflict literature that rests on the assumption that violent conflict is destructive and
inefficient. Within this literature, the occurrence of violence is therefore explained in terms of
4“Genocidal” refers to the adoption of mass indiscriminate violence as a means to consolidate power vis-a-vis
rival elites. It refers to the popular definition of genocide as mass violence against civilians rather than the
legal definition of genocide.
5Valentino 2004.
6E.g., Straus 2006; Prunier 1995.
7Fearon and Laitin 2003.
8See Valentino 2004; Lyall 2009.
9Valentino 2004.
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bargaining failure.10 This study, however, proposes a radically different cause of bargaining
failure: the violence itself is a consumption good. When between-group conflict (e.g., Hutu
vs. Tutsi) generates within-group—e.g., Hutu vs. Hutu—security benefits that outweigh
the costs of conflict, violence is no longer ex-post inefficient.11 This explains instances in
which authoritarian leaders may seem to use violence irrationally: they are actually seeking
internal self-preservation. In these cases, conflict resolution attempts to resolve bargaining
failures are likely to fail.
Third, this paper provides new insights into little-known processes of authoritarian con-
solidation. Researchers have identified a variety of coup-proofing strategies that leaders may
use to reduce coup risks.12 However, these strategies to manage elites are typically not viable
when the leader is at power parity with strong rivals, as these rivals may counteract with a
coup. By focusing on elite support coalitions, this paper contributes to the growing research
into the violent coalition-building and disempowerment tactics that authoritarian leaders
adopt to manage rivalry.
EXISTING EXPLANATIONS OF MASS INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE
Mass indiscriminate violence—also referred to as mass killing, democide, or (high intensity)
geno-politicide13—is rare, but nonetheless responsible for two to five times as many deaths
as the battle deaths of inter- and intra-state conflict combined.14 It is a type of mass political
violence with four defining characteristics: 1) it intentionally targets a massive number of
noncombatants;15 2) it targets an outgroup—an ethnicity, religion, or class that is not part
of the governing coalition; 3) it is indiscriminate—targets outgroup victims irrespective of
10See Fearon 1995. While bargaining failure is used to explain conflicts that result in mass indiscriminate
violence, it is not generally used to explain mass violence itself as it is generally viewed as an indivisible
good. When the government simply aims to kill outgroup civilians there seems little room for bargaining.
11E.g., Fearon 1995.
12E.g. Roessler 2011; Svolik 2012.




their behavior; and 4) it is not aimed at political control of this outgroup.16 The staggering
scale and indiscriminate nature of the violence have sparked broad scholarly interest that
has provided various explanations for its occurrence. Under specific conditions of guerrilla
conflict, mass indiscriminate violence has been shown to be effective in order to starve a
guerrilla of its support. These ‘drain the seas ’ massacres commonly occur in protracted
irregular guerrilla wars.17 Consequently, counter-guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence is
concentrated within territories where a guerrilla is dominant. However, in roughly 40% of
mass violence episodes (e.g., Rwanda and Cambodia), the violence was aimed at populations
within areas of secure territorial control. This paper focuses on those instances of mass
indiscriminate violence in areas that lack any real guerrilla presence.
Outside of irregular guerrilla conflict, surprisingly few theoretical explanations of mass
indiscriminate violence account for strategic actors’ material interests. While there exist
excellent case studies of mass indiscriminate violence,18 these cannot provide a single par-
simonious explanation for its occurrence. Large-n comparative studies, on the other hand,
have focused on prediction over theoretical explanations.19 Moreover, though it has been well
established that governments initiate mass indiscriminate violence,20 violence is commonly
examined with the implicit assumption that governmental actors lack agency and are car-
ried away by larger societal forces of ethnic hatred and primordial cleavages.21 Explanations
that do address why governments initiate mass indiscriminate violence fall into the broad
categories of i) leader ideology; and ii) between-group conflict.
By introducing leader behavior, Valentino offers a seminal political science explanation for
the occurrence of mass indiscriminate violence.22 Valentino provides a typology that contains
a wealth of information with respect to mass indiscriminate violence, as well as a convincing
16After Kalyvas 2006.
17Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino 2004.
18E.g., Straus 2006; Prunier 1995; Gagnon 2006.
19E.g., Harff 2003.




strategic explanation for the occurrence of mass indiscriminate counter-guerrilla violence.
However, with respect to all other instances of mass indiscriminate violence, Valentino argues
that leaders have a ideological preference for the extermination of groups that they perceive
as a threat to their—Communist or Ethnic Supremacist—vision of society. Recent studies
do show that ideology is undeniably part of the process of mass violence.23 Ideology may
shape elites’ threat perception and understanding of a conflict, as well as determine the range
of options available;24 or help mobilize supporters, while providing a rationalization for and
targets of the violence.25 However, while mass violence and extremist ideology correspond,
the ideology explanation leaves room for rival or complementary theories that take leaders’
material interests into account, since ideology i) can motivate a wide range of behaviors; and
ii) doesn’t explain temporal variation of the violence.
First, ideology can motivate a wide range of behaviors. Explanations that rely on the
radicalism of the ideology, for example, carry an implicit reference to the violence that we
seek to explain: are Communist and Supremacist leaders that do not engage in mass violence
actually less radical or do scholars attribute less radical ideologies because they kill fewer
people? Straus addresses this issue by demonstrating that different pre-existing ‘founding’
narratives result in different responses to similarly violent challenges.26 Still, even if we
accept that ideology shapes elites’ evaluation and behavior,27 elites can take a wide range of
ideological positions and corresponding policies within the bandwidth of a single ideological
background. Therefore, the deadly ideological extremism and the corresponding policy may
follow pre-existing material interests. For example, Pol Pot’s choice to single out the rival
North West region for rice extraction and corresponding starvation28 is but one of many
positions he could have taken within the framework of his radical Communist ideology. It
23E.g., see Maynard 2019; Walter 2017; Straus 2015.
24E.g., see Maynard 2019; Straus 2015.
25The mobilization component regularly features in studies of mass violence. E.g., Walter 2017; Straus 2006;
Hinton 2005.
26Straus 2015.
27E.g., see Maynard 2019; Straus 2015.
28Kiernan 2008
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is likely not a coincidence that his deadly policies closely aligned with his material goals.
Leader ideology, therefore, leaves room for a complementary or rival explanation based on
leaders’ material interests.
Second, ideology doesn’t explain temporal variation.29 Both in Cambodia and Rwanda,
for example, mass indiscriminate violence occurred in an environment of high insecurity and
rivalry at the top of the regime.30 By itself, mass indiscriminate violence against civilians
comes at high risk to a leader, because indiscriminate targeting on the basis of—ethnic,
religious, or class—identity generates increased resistance. While all authoritarian regimes
adopt repression, most repressive violence is selective; it targets people based on their be-
havior. Selective violence demonstrates to potential opponents that resistance is costly. It
is, therefore, instrumental to political control of an area, a population, or government.
Indiscriminate violence, on the other hand, targets people on the basis of identity—
irrespective of behavior. It, therefore, demonstrates to potential victims that cooperation
is futile and helps coordinate resistance and generates opposition.31 Moreover, mass indis-
criminate violence may undermine the ability of the armed forces to respond forcefully to
external threats,32 while the resulting humanitarian and refugee crisis may invite foreign
intervention, as was the case in Cambodia and Kosovo.33 Consequently, the domestic and
international opposition generated by mass indiscriminate violence makes it an especially
risky strategy for authoritarian leaders that seek survival.
Purges34 of regime elites also come at high risk to a leader, because authoritarian leaders
rely on elite support for survival. It is apparent that rivals may pose high risks to a leader’s
survival. Nonetheless, authoritarian leaders must take great care before they move against
29E.g., see Van der Maat 2018.
30Straus 2006; Kiernan 2008.
31Kalyvas 2006. In Darfur, for example, mass indiscriminate raids spurred an insurgency—see Cockett 2010.
32E.g., in Rwanda, senior Hutu military officers, such as Lt. Col. Rwainda and Col. Gatsinzi, went into
hiding during the war. Lanotte 2007.
33Scholars disagree whether Kosovo qualifies as mass violence. Still, the humanitarian crisis combined with
the fallout of Rwanda influenced the US decision to intervene. See Power 2002.
34Throughout this paper purge will refer exclusively to the (violent) removal of ingroup elites from the
regime.
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ingroup rivals, as the targets of the purge may counteract with a coup themselves.35 Author-
itarian leaders care about political and physical survival.36 It is therefore unclear why these
leaders would take on the outgroup and elite ingroup rivals at the same time. Why would
these leaders risk life and liberty to achieve their ideological vision of society when they are
least secure? Why not consolidate power first? By itself, radical ideology does not suggest a
specific timing or efficiency of the violence. However, if leaders care about their own physical
survival besides ideology, we should expect authoritarian leaders to be more likely to execute
their pet project when they are most, not least secure.37 Conversely, these leaders might be
ideological zealots with a personal and irrational preference for violence without regard for
their security.38 However, if these leaders are ideological zealots, we should observe violence
to occur irrespective of elite rivalry and observe a higher rate of violent removal for these
irrational leaders.
The second explanation posits mass indiscriminate violence as a strategy of removing an
outgroup threat. Several scholars have observed that mass indiscriminate violence is more
likely to occur following civil war.39 Licklider, for example, argues that mass indiscriminate
violence results from a one-sided victory in civil war.40 Similarly, Straus argues that the
Hutu leadership instigated mass violence as a desperate measure to win an impending civil
war.41 In both instances, mass indiscriminate violence is argued to be aimed at the civilian
support-base of outgroup rebels that may pose a future threat. However, these arguments
do not address the occurrence of indiscriminate violence in areas of secure territorial control
where selective violence is both feasible and effective.42
Furthermore, these arguments do not address the actual mechanisms through which
35Roessler 2011; Chiozza and Goemans 2011.
36Svolik 2012.
37Elite ideology could potentially be a source of elite rivalry. However, leaders that care about their physical
survival would similarly be expected to resolve elite rivalry before embarking upon mass indiscriminate
violence.
38See for example Byman and Pollack 2001.





mass indiscriminate violence against civilians would be an effective strategy to deal with an
outgroup threat. These studies implicitly adopt a counter-guerrilla mechanism to explain
violence that occurs far from areas with any actual guerrilla activity. These hinge on the
assumption that outgroup militants can more effectively rely on co-ethnics for support43 and
that mass indiscriminate violence undermines the ability of outgroup militants to pose a
future threat. In other words, governments seek to starve these militants from a potential
civilian support base. However, while guerrilla forces do rely on civilians for food, supplies,
and recruitment,44 they do not actually require the support of a co-ethnic population. Guer-
rilla forces commonly coerce and prey on civilians to survive.45 Through the use of selective
violence, militants can coerce a civilian population into support in areas in which they are
dominant46 even if they do not share ethnicity. This explains why in Guatemala, for example,
much of the government violence was aimed at Native American towns that did not share
ethnicity with the rebels and were coerced by rebel forces.47 Consequently, the mechanisms
from counter-guerrilla mass violence cannot simply be exported to a non-counter-guerrilla
environment.
Moreover, in many instances of mass indiscriminate violence, such as during Mao’s Great
Leap Forward or Cultural Revolution, an outgroup guerrilla was completely absent. In other
instances, the argument for an outgroup threat does not hold up to scrutiny. In Cambodia,
for example, the Lon Nol regime had been thoroughly defeated and cannot explain four years
of mass indiscriminate violence against various outgroups.48 More importantly, none of the
explanations that posit mass indiscriminate violence as a strategy to remove an outgroup
threat would lead us to expect the violence to be related to heightened ingroup competition






48While (previous) conflict may support the mobilization of militias that execute mass violence, it cannot
explain government initiation of the violence.
49Note that Roessler argues that leaders rely on co-ethnics as a coup-proofing strategy, which reduces control
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This paper will demonstrate that mass indiscriminate violence corresponds to elite compe-
tition in roughly 40% of cases in which the violence is not part of a counter-guerrilla strategy.
Therefore, I argue that in these cases, not outgroup threat, but elite ingroup rivalry drives
leaders to initiate mass indiscriminate violence. Let us now turn to the mechanisms that
connect authoritarian competition to mass indiscriminate violence.
A THEORY OF GENOCIDAL CONSOLIDATION
At the top of authoritarian regimes, the constitutional checks and balances that protect
elites from violence from competitors in liberal democracies are mostly weak or absent. As a
result, elites at the top of authoritarian regimes find their power checked by rival elites and
have a high risk of losing life or liberty upon losing office.50
In order to survive in this insecure environment, elites rely on their own support coali-
tion, as well as on alliances with other elites. Elite support coalitions are built on formal
and informal relationships with clients in various state institutions, such as the military
and bureaucracy.51 However, the importance of maintaining these support coalitions also
creates a security dilemma; elites will rationally seek to strengthen their support coalitions
versus their potential competitors. However, this fuels competition, strains relations, and
generates volatility at the top of the regime, which effectively decreases security for all. High
volatility and insecurity lock rival elites in a deadly commitment problem—even when they
prefer cooperation over deadly competition—as either would be most secure without the
other. Therefore, neither can commit they will not remove their rival in a coup or purge
at the first opportunity. Moreover, coups and purges are especially deadly: they are secret,
sudden, of close proximity, and—unlike rebellions—do seldom allow for a fighting retreat.
Consequently, to leaders that seek political and physical survival, the threat of elite or intra-
of ethnic outgroups and leads to civil war. While this provides a convincing explanation for civil war
resulting from elite competition, mass indiscriminate violence is explained as part of a counter-guerrilla
strategy—see Roessler 2011.
50Svolik 2012; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Roessler 2011.
51See Dittmer 1978; Hinton 2005.
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group competition is much more acute than that of any rebellion originating from outside
the regime.52
Recent studies provide some insight into strategies that leaders adopt to deal with elite
rivalry: they may tie up the military in the execution of a war;53 take information short-
cuts by homogenizing—e.g., ethnically—their inner circle;54 or slowly creep into power to
the point where coups become too costly.55 However, though ethnic homogenization may
alleviate the commitment problem, it is unclear how it would solve it, as co-ethnics may dis-
place a leader as well. Coup proofing—reshuffling government, appointing co-ethnics, and
purging coalition allies—initially exacerbates the security dilemma, increasing coup threat.56
Though coup proofing becomes a viable strategy once the leader has reached a threshold of
power, it is unclear how leaders reach that threshold when rivals are strong and the need for
security is highest. How do authoritarian leaders deal with this dilemma?
Political Consolidation through Mass Violence
I argue that authoritarian leaders57 faced with elite rivalry may adopt mass indiscriminate
violence to strengthen their support coalitions and weaken those of rivals to ensure survival.
First, the violence helps build coalitions with various constituencies that gain from violence
against outgroups. It thereby builds a formidable repressive apparatus that can also be
turned on ingroup rivals. Second, the violence indirectly targets the support coalitions of
rival elites by undermining the formal monopoly of violence and forcing local security officials
to facilitate or oppose the violence. It thereby provides rivals’ supporters with an exit option,
provides information on rivals’ supporters’ private loyalties, and undermines rivals’ abilities
52Roessler 2011.
53Chiozza and Goemans 2011.
54Roessler 2011.
55Svolik 2012.
56Roessler 2011; Sudduth 2017a.
57For ease of exposition, I distinguish between a leader—who initiates mass violence—and rival elites. How-
ever, a strong faction of elites may experience the same threats and also be in a position to initiate mass
indiscriminate violence—as was the case for the Rwandan Akazu or Suharto in Indonesia, for example. In
this case, the rival faction takes the role of the leader in the theory.
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to mount an effective resistance.
Because this type of mass indiscriminate violence is part of a process of consolidation, I
refer to this process as “genocidal consolidation,” which has five partly overlapping stages.
The first stage is elite rivalry, which is established as the main condition under which genoci-
dal consolidation occurs. The second stage is raising (i.e., expanding, creating, or capturing)
a machinery of violence that is free from control of rival elites in the form of irregular, militia,
or paramilitary clients. The third stage is the signalling of popular support for the geno-
cidal faction and for its violence. The fourth stage is that of undermining of rival support
coalitions. And the final stage is that of purges of rival elites following weakening of rival
support coalitions. To provide a roadmap of the theory, a causal diagram of the full process
of genocidal consolidation is presented in Figure 1 below.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1: Theory of Genocidal Consolidation
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Elite Rivalry
Elite rivalry is among the most salient threats to authoritarian elites. The pressures of
elite rivalry are so intimately connected to the physical survival of elites that otherwise
unimaginable policies, like the mass killing of innocents, can become feasible. There are
many reasons why authoritarian coalitions may disintegrate. In Cambodia, for example,
factionalization within the Khmer Rouge turned salient and violent following victory in
war.58 Other times the leader is confronted with a (post-revolutionary) drive for openness
and democracy supported by the military or other elites within his own regime, as was the
case for Milosevic in Serbia and for reactionary “extremists” in Rwanda.59
Raising a Machinery of Violence
Faced with the threats of elite rivalry, leaders may adopt mass violence to strengthen their
support coalitions. It is obvious that mass indiscriminate violence requires a machinery
of violence to execute the violence. It is less obvious that mass indiscriminate violence
can also expand or capture a machinery of violence that is free from control of rival elites.
When state power is deeply divided, elites may seek to build coalitions with groups outside
state institutions, such as militias and paramilitary groups. In Rwanda and Yugoslavia, for
example, hooligans were secretly armed by the government to create militias;60 in China Mao
raised the Red Guards as part of the cultural revolution;61 and in Cambodia, Pol Pot raised
an irregular group of model adolescent peasants from the South Western zone to export the
revolution to other areas.62
Militias, paramilitary, or other irregular forces—hereafter militias—are notably hard to
control, however, as their members face both cost and benefits of violence; militias may
58Vickery 1983; Kiernan 2008.
59Gagnon 2006; Storey 2012.




be overly violent in pursuit of material and non-material gains63 or reluctant to perpetrate
violence in fear of revenge or prosecution.64 We should therefore expect variation in how
militias evaluate costs and benefits of indiscriminate violence, which should also be related to
the manner of mobilization.65 Mass indiscriminate violence is oftentimes executed by quickly
raised and poorly controlled predatory militias that consist of young, poor, and low-status
individuals that join for quick economic and status gains.66 While these militias are hard to
control directly, they can be steered to use violence against outgroups.
The leader can therefore rely on predatory militias containing poor, unemployed, or low-
status individuals that have most to gain from the redistributive nature of violence. By
facilitating violence, the leader provides armed thugs with the wealth, power, and status
that violence provides. By advancing ideology, the leader provides armed thugs with a
moral incentive as well as clear outgroup targets for their violence. Mass indiscriminate
violence can, therefore, be a means of paying these groups, provide legitimacy, create mutual
goals, and build a patron-client relationship.67 In Rwanda, for example, the interahamwe
militias recruited among the poor. Once the violence started, the poorest at the bottom
rung of society—such as the homeless unemployed—joined the militias to gain from the
violence.68 These armed thugs—even when banded together in paramilitary groups—are no
match for professional forces and are unlikely to directly engage armed support coalitions
of rival elites.69 They are, however, cheap, easily steered towards outgroups, and highly
effective at terrorizing civilians.70
63Mitchell 2004.
64DeMeritt 2015.
65After Weinstein 2003. Local militias that are mobilized to protect their communities are less likely to use
indiscriminate violence, for example
66E.g., Prunier 1995; Kiernan 2008; Mitchell 2004.
67See Driscoll 2015; Mitchell 2004.
68Prunier 1995, 231.
69See Mueller 2004. The Interahamwe militias in Rwanda, for example, fled before the RPF advance without




Armed thugs can unleash sudden and overwhelming indiscriminate violence on outgroup
civilians—based on ethnic, religious, or class background—and plunge the country into chaos.
The majority of ingroup civilians has close relations with members of the outgroup,71 but
will be powerless to intervene for four reasons: first, the violence against the outgroup is
demonstrative: ingroup civilians observe their fate if they are branded a traitor; second,
any remaining attempts at protecting the outgroup are met with extreme selective violence;
third, they may become potential targets for retributions from outgroup militants; and last,
all that is needed for evil to triumph is for good people to do nothing. The leader does
not require active support, but merely requires inaction. When action is costly and inaction
signals support for the violence, the leader can seemingly have broad support from those
that seek to keep their heads on by keeping them down.
Rwanda demonstrates how civilians can be singled out and coerced into participating in
public acts of violence. Killings were mostly executed by day and widely announced before
and after the event.72 While the Interahamwe militias carried out most of the violence,
the group of perpetrators was broader: Hutu with familial ties to militia members or Hutu
encountered en route to Tutsi homes were ordered to join the mob and provide auxiliary
support. Any Hutu that dared to save Tutsi were forced to kill those Tutsi themselves or
be killed as a traitor.73 While Hutu civilians were able to help Tutsis by night, when they
were alone, or in small groups, it was impossible to stop the killing as part of larger mobs.74
Under the condition of mass mobilization, ordinary people that would otherwise be unwilling
to take part in the violence and support the leader appear “willing executioners.”75 This is
key feature of the violence as it signals broad societal support for the genocidal regime—even
71E.g., as neighbors, friends, or spouses. In Rwanda, interviews with génocidaires indicate that almost all
had Tutsi neighbors and friends, and that most had Tutsi family members. Moreover, Tutsi survivors




75Coined by Goldhagen to denote broad German support for the Holocaust. Goldhagen 1996.
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when a majority is privately opposed to the violence.
Undermine Rival Support Coalitions
Like the rest of society, local and regional security officials in the government, police, or
military, are pressured into non-intervention and support of the violence. Rapidly changing
facts on the ground, coupled with signals of broad ingroup support for the violence, hamper
the ability of local officials to respond forcefully—especially when they have extremists in
their ranks. Though some officials resist, most are unwilling to risk their lives amidst the
insecurity generated by the violence. Local officials are acutely aware that resistance to the
violence makes them a prime target. These pressures force realignment of local officials in
support of the genocidal faction and allow the replacement of local officials with the leader’s
clients.
In order to maintain the support of their supporters in an insecure environment, both
leader and rival need to signal strength and control. There exist three related mechanisms
by which genocidal consolidation may more effectively neutralize or weaken rival factions
than conventional coups and purges. First, genocidal consolidation targets the outgroup
and does not target the rival faction directly. Where a direct assault on the rival faction
would solve collective action problems and unify resistance, genocidal consolidation allows
rival supporters to switch sides or remain neutral as a low-risk option. Second, the violence
provides information about the (private) loyalties of local officials. Those that resist the
violence signal opposition to the genocidal faction, whereas those that facilitate the violence
signal support. This information allows for targeted selective violence against local officials
that oppose the genocidal faction. Last, while rival elites need their local support base to
unite and actively oppose the genocidal faction and the violence, parts of their local support
base will opt for passive acquiescence instead. This ensures that rivals can no longer mount
an effective resistance and allows for the genocidal faction to take control. In both Cambodia
and Rwanda, for example, key local officials that had previously been aligned with the rival
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faction opted to support or not to oppose the violence.
In Rwanda, for example, the strongest resistance to the genocide was observed in regions
in which the rival reformist faction was dominant. Here, local security officials successfully
mobilized their populations in opposition to the genocide.76 However, as the genocide spread
across communes throughout the country, reactionary “extremists” consolidated in neigh-
boring communes. This freed-up the militias that had been mobilized in other regions, which
then began to make incursions into the reformist-controlled holdout communes. Under con-
ditions of increasing external pressure, local and regional security officials were increasingly
likely to step down or fall in line as the genocide spread. Those few that didn’t were mostly
killed or forced to flee.77 In only two weeks, the genocide spread from sectors and communes
under reactionary control to incorporate the entire Hutu state, breaking any Hutu opposition
in its wake.
Purges of Rival Elites
During the final stages of genocidal consolidation, selective violence can be fully turned
towards those rival elites at the top of the regime. Rival elites that have lost their sup-
port coalitions are vulnerable and can be violently purged as traitors or collaborators. In
Rwanda, for example, the top of the military leadership was forced into hiding.78 Similarly
in Cambodia, over half of the highest-ranking members of the communist Khmer regime
had been purged by 1979.79 Still, genocidal consolidation is not without its costs. It helps
coordinate resistance from the outgroup, it may invite foreign intervention, and the reliance
on militias may undermine state structures such as the military.80 The leader will be more





80See Ahram 2014. Note that militia and paramilitary clients may have difficulty to establish an independent
power base. After the violence, newly purged state bureaucracies–now loyal to the leader–commonly
undermine the outsiders that purged their ranks. Therefore, irregular clients become completely dependent
on their patron. E.g., see Dittmer 1978.
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threat.
Scope and testable Implications
The theory of genocidal consolidation relies on three core mechanism that determine the
scope of the argument: 1) elites that lose power due to elite rivalry are at high risk of
physical harm (e.g., death, imprisonment); mass violence can potentially resolve this rivalry
because 2) it facilitates authoritarian coalition building; and 3) it can divide and undermine
support coalitions of rival elites. First, as none of these mechanisms would operate in a
democratic environment with working checks and balances, the primary theoretical scope of
the argument relates to authoritarian regimes—or at least non-democratic regimes.81
Second, for mass violence to divide support coalitions of rival elites, the violence should
include those areas in which rival elites have their support coalitions, which mostly excludes
counter-guerrilla mass violence in peripheral areas of rebel activity. However, as the geo-
graphical co-occurrence of elite support coalitions and violence cannot be observed outside
the occurrence of violence, it cannot inform the empirical scope of the study. Therefore, as
outlined below, it provides us with key observable implications instead.82
The theory, as outlined above, also leads to several observable expectations.83 First,
we should expect non-democratic leaders to be more likely to adopt mass indiscriminate
violence under conditions of high elite rivalry when their tenure is threatened. The arrow
H1 in Figure 2 below, visually illustrates how this expectation is related to the theory of
genocidal consolidation. However, if there are no security benefits to mass indiscriminate
violence and it is driven by leader ideology alone, we should expect rational leaders to be
more likely to instigate violence when they are most, not least secure.
81In competitive authoritarian regimes, deposed leaders may face imprisonment—e.g., former Ukrainian
President Tymoshenko. Moreover, mass violence may occur in democratizing countries—e.g., Yugoslavia
in the early 90s.
82Further discussion of the theoretical scope conditions including elite ideology and societal cleavages is
provided in appendix A.
83These expectations assume that genocidal consolidation is a mostly rational strategy. It does not assume
that genocidal leaders have a perfect understanding of the underlying mechanisms but that these leaders
have some intuition that genocidal consolidation strengthens their position versus immediate rivals.
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H1: High elite rivalry corresponds to the onset of non-counter-guerrilla mass
violence.
Here we should also distinguish between counter-guerrilla mass violence and genocidal con-
solidation, as there is no reason to assume that an increased risk to tenure would correspond
to the onset of counter-guerrilla mass violence.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2: Hypotheses related to Genocidal Consolidation
Second, we should expect leaders to adopt mass violence to eliminate elite rivals. Con-
sequently, the theory leads us to expect that genocidal consolidation should correspond to
elite purges, which also represent the leader’s increased consolidation. This is illustrated by
arrow H2 in Figure 2. Alternative explanations that posit mass indiscriminate violence to
be aimed at an outgroup support base, would not expect elite purges during spells of mass
indiscriminate violence.
H2: Non-counter-guerrilla mass violence increases the likelihood of elite purges.
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Again, we do not expect an increased propensity for elite purges during counter-guerrilla
mass violence, as it is expected to be unrelated to elite rivalry.
Third, we should expect genocidal consolidation to be a rational strategy that increases
the likelihood of a leader’s survival. Still, genocidal consolidation is a form of indiscriminate
violence and is therefore expected to generate coordinated resistance from its targets. As
such, genocidal consolidation should result in a greater propensity to win intra-regime or
within-group conflicts, but only at the cost of a reduced propensity to win between-group
conflicts. Moreover, it is likely that those leaders that are already at great risk (due to the
competition from rival elites) are also the most likely to initiate genocidal consolidation.
Genocidal consolidation is a risky strategy that we expect leaders to pursue only because
of a greater risk from rival elites. Because leaders at high risk of losing tenure are also
most likely to turn to genocidal consolidation, the proposition that genocidal consolidation
is instrumental to survival is not readily observable.
Therefore, we should account for these selection effects and expect leaders that adopt
genocidal consolidation to have a lower probability to suffer irregular removals originating
from within the regime and suffer less adverse fates (i.e., death, imprisonment, or exile) than
similar leaders that do not. Specifically, the reduction in the more acute risk of internal re-
moval should translate into a lower probability of death and imprisonment fates in particular.
Moreover, because of the inherent risks of mass indiscriminate violence, leaders may have
a higher risk of removal from external sources, such as rebellion and foreign intervention.
These risks of external removal might translate into a higher probability of exile, but not
necessarily death or imprisonment as external removals are more likely to allow for a fighting
retreat. Arrow H3 in Figure 2, illustrates that the reduced probability of adverse leader fates
is a signal of intra-group consolidation. Alternative explanations, that rely on irrationally
violent or ideology-driven leaders that initiate mass indiscriminate violence without regard
for their security would predict a higher likelihood of adverse fates.
H3: Leaders that initiate genocidal consolidation are less likely to experience
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adverse fates originating from within the regime than similar leaders that do not.
EMPIRICS
This paper aims to establish whether genocidal consolidation (non-counter-guerrilla mass
violence) differs from counter-guerrilla mass violence; whether genocidal consolidation is
connected to elite rivalry and purges; and whether it is instrumental to authoritarian survival.
To examine the relationship between genocidal consolidation and elite rivalry, this study
leverages newly collected original data, both on mass indiscriminate violence and on elite
purges in non-democratic countries from 1950 until 2004. The empirical strategy consists
of three distinct analyses—“Genocidal Consolidation Onset,” “Elite Purges,” and “Leader
Fates”—that each connect to the expected relationships outlined above.
Analyses, data, and selection
The Genocidal Consolidation Onset Analysis seeks to establish whether elite rivalry corre-
sponds to the subsequent onset of mass indiscriminate violence. Here, the unit of analysis
is country-year, the main independent variable is elite rivalry, and the dependent variable is
counter-guerrilla or non-counter-guerrilla mass violence. The data relevant to this analysis,
while broad, accounts for the “possibility principle”84 by pruning irrelevant observations—
i.e., developed, small, and/or democratic states—from the analysis.85
The Elite Purges Analysis seeks to establish whether mass indiscriminate violence years
correspond to purges of regime elites. Here, the unit of analysis is country-year, the indepen-
dent variable is Counter-guerrilla or Non-counter-guerrilla Mass Violence, and the dependent
84See Mahoney and Goertz 2004.
85There is no empirical incidence of non-counter-guerrilla mass violence in developed, very small, or demo-
cratic states, which likely include observations that should not be compared to regimes in which non-
counter-guerrilla mass violence does occur—eg., Singapore, Brunei, or the USA. Development is considered
to reduce the risk of mass violence—e.g., see Bellamy 2014. Moreover, low rates of poverty are unlikely to
drive the mobilization of irregular clients expected by the theory. Violence in small states is unlikely to
reach high casualty levels. As noted above, this study considers non-democratic regimes at least partly in
the set of relevant cases and includes all countries with a Polity score of 5 or lower.
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variable is Elite Purges. To observe Elite Purges, I rely on the collection of original data on
purges of potential challengers within the regime. To aid data collection, this study adopted
two mutually reinforcing data selection strategies. First, I collected country-year data on
elite purges by country study of the period between 1950 and 2004. The country studies
included all 20 countries that experienced mass violence as well as 9 countries that did not ex-
perience mass violence but that contained the 19 highest-risk leaders that were most likely to
initiate non-counter-guerrilla mass violence but did not.86 This resulted in 1042 country-year
observations, which have considerable variation on key dependent and independent variables
and are comparable on control variables. By selecting by country, I am selecting cases that
are comparable to mass violence cases and similar on unobservables. The advantage of the
first selection strategy is clear internal validity in a general sample of relevant authoritarian
regimes; effectively I am comparing elite purges at times of mass violence to elite purges
at other—less violent—times in countries that could potentially experience mass violence.
Second, I collected additional observations that were estimated to be at-risk of genocidal
consolidation. This sample allows for a comparison between at-risk observations with and
without mass violence, alleviates selection concerns, and demonstrates external validity.87
Finally, the Leader Fates Analysis seeks to establish whether the initiation of mass in-
discriminate violence corresponds to irregular removals and adverse fates of leaders. Here,
the unit of analysis is the leader, the independent variable or treatment is the initiation
of non-counter-guerrilla mass violence, and the dependent variables are adverse fates (i.e.,
death, imprisonment, or exile) and irregular removals within five years. Both the treatment
and control units were drawn from the pool of non-democratic regimes and only a single
observation with the highest predicted probability of genocidal consolidation was selected
for each leader.88
If the theory is correct, we would expect these analyses to show: 1) that elite rivalry
86Specifically, Russia (USSR), Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Chad, Thailand, Laos, Bangladesh, and
Myanmar as listed in Table A.2 of the Appendix.
87As further addressed in the analysis and Web Appendix B.
88See Web Appendix E.
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corresponds to a greater likelihood of genocidal consolidation; 2) that genocidal consolidation
corresponds to a greater probability of elite purges; and 3) that leaders who initiate genocidal
consolidation have a significantly reduced probability of adverse leader fates such as death
and imprisonment as well as of irregular removal through internal sources. Descriptives of
these key variables are provided in Table 1 below.
[Table 1 about here]
Two Types of Mass Indiscriminate Violence. The theory of genocidal consolidation
expects the mechanisms that underlie counter-guerrilla and non-counter-guerrilla mass indis-
criminate violence to predictably differ. The mechanisms of counter-guerrilla mass violence
are well-explained. Moreover, counter-guerrilla mass violence predominantly occurs in the
periphery where outgroup guerrillas are dominant. These are unlikely to be areas in which
rival ingroup elites have their support coalitions. Counter-guerrilla mass violence is there-
fore expected to be outside the scope of the genocidal consolidation argument. Therefore, I
constructed a new dataset that distinguishes between all instances of counter-guerrilla and
non-counter-guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence after the Second World War. The ex-
haustive list of leaders that initiated the different types of Mass Indiscriminate Violence89 is
presented in Table 2 below.
These mass indiscriminate violence spells build on existing mass violence data.90 Because
the theory provides an explanation of mass violence, I follow Valentino and adopt a casualty
threshold of 10,000 annual deaths to be considered Mass Indiscriminate Violence.91 The first
advantage of a focus on mass violence is that it ensures that the phenomena under exam-
ination are similar. For example, the academically problematic legal definition of genocide
89Variable names are capitalized throughout this paper.
90Harff 2003; Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat 2006; Valentino 2004.
91Valentino adopts a slightly more restrictive threshold of 50,000 deaths over five years. Valentino 2004. The
threshold of 10,000 annual deaths captures all instances of mass violence that are qualitatively in the set of
geno-/politicide or mass killing—e.g., Rwanda, Sudan, and Iraq. Moreover, all cases below the threshold—
e.g., post-coup Argentina—are qualitatively different. Treating these as mass violence observations would
constitute conceptual stretching. For Kosovo there is some uncertainty as to the number of victims. I
follow the estimate of roughly 10,000 deaths by Ball et al. 2002.
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Table 1: Descriptives
† Observations in matched leader sample.
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may include massacres of small groups or tribes that are incomparable to the mass violence
in Guatemala, Cambodia or Rwanda. The second advantage of a focus on mass violence is
that it aids the distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence at the aggregate
level. While it might be possible to selectively kill thousands of civilians, mass violence that
runs in the ten thousands of civilian casualties is predominantly indiscriminate.
[Table 2 about here]
To establish the type of mass indiscriminate violence (i.e. counter-guerrilla or non-
counter-guerrilla),92 the data builds on Lyall and Wilson’s listing of guerrilla conflicts.93 To
code Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence, I first determined whether the country had a guerrilla
presence according to Lyall and Wilson. If a guerrilla was present and mass indiscriminate
violence was restricted to areas of rebel activity, the violence was coded as Counter-Guerrilla
Mass Violence. If a guerrilla was present and mass indiscriminate violence occurred in areas
far from rebel activity, the violence was coded as Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence.94
If Lyall and Wilson did not have a guerrilla presence, the violence was also coded as Non-
Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence.95 In the analyses that follow, genocidal consolidation is
operationalized as Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence. It is important to note, however,
that these non-counter-guerrilla mass violence spells are merely unexplained instances of
mass indiscriminate violence. Their only distinguishing feature is that they occur outside
guerrilla conflict. While these are expected to be cases of genocidal consolidation, there is
nothing in their coding that would favor one explanation over another.
92While these two types of mass violence could theoretically co-occur, this is unlikely because their underlying
mechanisms are different. The regime would be pursuing two separate strategies of mass violence in
response to two different threats. Empirically, there is little indication that counter-guerrilla and non-
counter-guerrilla co-occur; at least not from the outset of the violence. However, genocidal consolidation
could incite rebellion. The closest example of co-occurrence of non-counter-guerrilla and counter-guerrilla
mass violence would be the final months of the Khmer regime in Cambodia, when So Phim’s troops rebelled
after his purge and Pol Pot responded with indiscriminate violence in the Eastern region.
93Lyall and Wilson 2009.
94E.g., the 1972 mass violence in Burundi followed a local Hutu uprising but immediately spread across the
whole country far from the province of rebel activity. Lemarchand 2011, 41.
95An exception is the blockade of secessionist Biafra in Nigeria, which was coded as Counter-guerrilla Mass
Violence, because it specifically targeted rebel areas.
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Table 2: Mass Indiscriminate Violence Leaders
Note that this list is exhaustive and therefore includes all leaders that initiated mass indiscriminate violence, killing 10,000
or more civilians per year, since 1945.
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Elite Rivalry. The first analysis adopts two measures of Elite Rivalry as the independent
variable. One measure relies on coup data provided by Marshall and Marshall, which not
only includes successful and failed coup attempts, but also includes alleged and rumored
coups.96 Together these provide a good proxy for Elite Rivalry within the regime. The other
measure of Elite Rivalry is a latent measure that relies on an estimation of the probability
of a Coup Attempt, which consists of observed coups or coup attempts. Here, I rely on
data from Powell and Thyne, which integrates various sources of coup data.97 To estimate
the latent Elite Rivalry measure, the model estimates the probability of a Coup Attempt
based on the time that a leader has been in office (Leader Tenure); whether the leader has
entered office in the previous two years (New Leader); and Minor Purges in addition to
control variables. Leader Tenure captures increased stability over time, while New Leader
captures initial instability associated with new leaders; both are estimated from Archigos.98
Minor Purges indicate whether regime members are purged in a given year, irrespective of
their support coalitions or ability to actually threaten the position of the leader. As such,
it includes purges of rank-and-file members of the regime and is a measure of instability
within the regime. Purge data by Banks is adopted as the main proxy for Minor Purges,
because it is available for all country years.99 Any concerns with respect to the Banks data
are addressed in Web Appendix B.
Elite Purges. The second analysis adopts Elite Purges as the dependent variable. In con-
trast to Minor Purges, Elite Purges are conceptualized as the purge in any given year of elite
rivals that are part of the regime and may actually threaten the leader’s tenure and physical
security.100 Simply being a civilian cabinet minister was not sufficient to be considered an
elite rival, as coup attempts require control of armed support coalitions. Therefore, purged
96Marshall and Marshall 2009.
97Powell and Thyne 2011.
98Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009.
99Banks 2012.
100Following a coup, supporters of the previous regime are often purged. However, this is not considered an
elite purge unless they were part of the new regime. Here I differ from the analysis of purges of military
elites by Sudduth 2017b.
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elite rivals should have formal or informal control of support coalitions that have an armed
component, such as the military, secret police, armed paramilitary groups, or praetorian
guard. These rivals were operationalized as vice chairmen, senior military officers, chiefs
of staff, defense ministers, heads of the secret police, or regional governors in control of
armed forces. These elites have a key function within the regime and are not purged alone:
Elite Purges consistently coincide with the removal of rank-and-file members that form their
support coalitions. In order to determine the elite’s official position and support coalition
within the regime, Elite Purges were coded only when the name of the purged elite could
be established.101 It is dangerous to purge elite rivals and Elite Purges are correspondingly
rare. For example, only at four times did Mao purge elite rivals: Manchuria’s Governor Gao
Gang in 1954, General Peng Dehuai in 1959, Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi in 1966, and General
Lin Biao in 1971. Each of these Elite Purges corresponds to Minor Purges of junior regime
members that formed these rivals’ support coalitions.
Adverse Leader Fates and Irregular Removals. The adverse fates, Death, Impris-
onment, and Exile, code whether the leader suffers these fates within five years, excluding
natural death. Irregular Exit captures whether the leader is forcefully removed from office
within five years.102 Data on adverse fates and irregular exit was adopted from Archigos,103
which has the advantage over coup data that it is collected at the leader level and allows the
distinction between two types of Irregular Exit: Internal Irregular Exits that originate from
within the regime and External Irregular Exits that originate from outside the regime (i.e.,
rebellions and foreign interventions).
Control Variables. Several control variables are expected to be related to Mass Indis-
criminate Violence Onset or Elite Purges. The level of authoritarianism, as indicated by the
Polity score, is expected to affect both Mass Indiscriminate Violence as well as Elite Purges
101Data on named elites ensures transparency and replicability.
102Given the median authoritarian tenure of six years, five years is a considerable time.
103Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009.
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and was adopted from Cederman, Hug and Krebs without the PARREG component.104 Sim-
ilarly, GDP Per Capita and Population size have been found to correspond to various types
of political violence. These were coded as the log of a country’s GDP per capita and popula-
tion.105 Moreover, conflict has been found to correspond to the onset of Mass Indiscriminate
Violence.106 Irregular Conflict in particular is expected to ease armed mobilization for both
types of mass indiscriminate violence.107 Data on Irregular Conflict is provided by Lyall and
Wilson 2009. Last, the theory expects militias to be part of the genocidal consolidation pro-
cess. However, militias might also be related to Elite Purges irrespective of the occurrence
of mass indiscriminate violence. Carey, Mitchell and Lowe provide data on the existence of
pro-government Militias from 1981 until 2004.108 For all mass violence observations before
1981, the presence of formal or informal pro-government Militias was researched. With re-
spect to potential genocidal consolidations (Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence), militias
are active in all cases before and after 1981. While this supports the expectations in the
theory, Militias cannot be estimated as part of a regular logit or probit regression on the
onset of genocidal consolidation, because its absence predicts non-occurrence perfectly.109
Elite Rivalry and Genocidal Consolidation Onset
Based on the theory, we expect to observe genocidal consolidation onset at times of high
elite rivalry. To test H1, I examine the relationship between Elite Rivalry (IV) and Mass
Indiscriminate Violence Onset in the following year (DV). Here, I first estimate a simple
model that relies on rumored coups (i.e. coups, coup attempts, as well as rumored or
alleged coups) as a proxy for Elite Rivalry. Coup rumors capture the coup and counter-coup
posturing within authoritarian regimes and therefore provide an observable measure of Elite




108Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013.
109This is not a concern, because Militias is theoretically and empirically part of the genocidal consolidation
process and post-treatment to Elite Rivalry.
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Rivalry and the corresponding risk to a leader’s tenure.
Results indeed suggest a strong relationship between Genocidal Consolidation—opera-
tionalized as Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence—onset and Elite Rivalry. As seen from
the first crosstab in Table 3 Genocidal Consolidation is, fortunately, rare with only 12 onsets
in the data, half of which directly correspond to Elite Rivalry. More sophisticated analysis,
presented in the first column of Table 4, reveals that high Elite Rivalry indeed corresponds to
a significantly higher probability of Genocidal Consolidation. As expected, Counter-Guerrilla
Mass Violence clearly differs from Genocidal Consolidation; while the second crosstab in
Table 3 is suggestive of a weak correlation between Elite Rivalry and Counter-Guerrilla
Mass Violence,110 the second column of Table 4 shows no significant relationship between
Elite Rivalry and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3: Crosstabs Elite Rivalry and Mass Violence
While genocidal consolidation is extremely rare, the effects of Elite Rivalry are consid-
erable, especially when we consider that genocidal consolidation has on average resulted
in 700,000 to a million (civilian) deaths. Therefore, a single percentage point increase in
110The weak correlation between Elite Rivalry and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence is interesting but beyond
the scope of this paper.
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the risk of genocidal consolidation corresponds to an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 deaths.111
For example, in any given year a median non-democratic regime has essentially a 0 per-
cent chance [CI 95%: 0.0%; 0.2%] of genocidal consolidation onset; during Elite Rivalry
this percentage increases to 0.6 percent [CI 95%: 0.1%; 1.6%]. Similarly, a large country
with guerrilla activity, like Indonesia before the return to democracy in 1998, would have
an estimated 1.0 percent risk [CI 95%: 0.0%; 5.0%] without Elite Rivalry and 5.7 percent
risk [CI 95%: 0.5%; 18.1 %] with Elite Rivalry. Moreover, the model explains a quarter to
a third of the variation in the onset of genocidal consolidation. As demonstrated in Tables
A.4 and G.8 of the Web Appendix, these results are robust to: Random Effects; Correction
for Temporal Dependence; Rare Events Logit; and the inclusion of Militias (using Firth’s
Penalized Likelihood), Civil Conflict Victory, Civil Conflict, and Horizontal Inequality.
[Table 4 about here]
Note that Elite Rivalry is actually a latent risk that we only occasionally observe: when
there is coup attempt. Instead of relying on coup rumors and allegations, we can estimate
Elite Rivalry by modeling the risk of a coup or coup attempt that a leader faces. In or-
der to capture the latent rivalry that a leader faces, I estimate a two-stage probit model
that first predicts the risk of a Coup Attempt and then adopts the corresponding estimate
as a predictor of genocidal consolidation—operationalized as Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass
Violence—and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence onset.112 The first stage generates an es-
timation of the latent risk of coups or coup attempts as a proxy for Elite Rivalry and is
presented in column 3 of Table 4. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 present the effects of the
estimated latent Elite Rivalry on Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence and genocidal consoli-
dation. The results are supportive of hypothis H1: Elite Rivalry corresponds strongly to
genocidal consolidation (column 4), but not to Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence (column 5).
Again, Elite Rivalry corresponds robustly to genocidal consolidation onset despite the small
111Admittedly, the number of deaths depends on population size and other factors, but the average civilian
cost provides some intuition of the impact.
112After Chiozza and Goemans 2003; latent model details are provided in Web Appendix C.1.
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Table 4: Elite Rivalry and Mass Indiscriminate Violence Onset
Probit analysis with robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Onsets only, ongoing mass indiscriminate
violence dropped from the analysis. Corrected for temporal order of Elite Rivalry and Mass Indiscriminate Violence Onsets.
†significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. Reported Pseudo R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina’s.
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sample of 12 genocidal consolidation observations. Moreover, the latent model captures a
considerable part of the variation in genocidal consolidation—as demonstrated in a pseudo
R2 of .28. Moreover—as shown in Table A.5 of the Web Appendix—these results are even
stronger when adopting my newly collected original data on Minor Purges instead of the
Banks data; and are robust to the inclusion of Civil Conflict or a first stage model that
estimates the risk of successful coups. Admittedly, two-stage models have their limitations
and effects are estimated on the basis of a small number of mass indiscriminate violence
onsets only. Nonetheless, the strong relationship between both measures of Elite Rivalry
and Genocidal Consolidation provides considerable support for the theory.
Although an in-depth qualitative analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the relation-
ship between elite rivalry and mass indiscriminate violence onset can be illustrated with cases
of genocidal consolidation. As mentioned, mass indiscriminate violence in Cambodia took
place under conditions of heightened elite competition following victory in war. In Rwanda,
the deeply factionalized Hutu elite competed in a highly volatile political environment; the
months before the genocide were characterized by political murders,113 organized mob at-
tacks on officials,114 and the build-up of armed militias.115 The Hutu military was similarly
divided with the risk of a coup at an all-time high116 and senior officers openly siding with
either faction.117 The assassination of the President and Chief of Staff pushed this rivalry to
its horrid conclusion; while the “reactionaries” were fighting for control of Kigali and began
killing civilians, their “reformist” rivals assumed control of a deeply divided military: for
three days, the reformist-controlled Rwandan army exchanged gun- and even artillery fire
with the reactionary-controlled Presidential Guard in and around Kigali.118
Similarly, Indonesia, Uganda, Burundi, and Nigeria in had coups or coup attempts in the
months preceding the onset of mass indiscriminate violence. Moreover, at the advent of the
113Prunier 1995, 185, 206-7; and Straus 2006, 198.
114Des Forges 1999, 63-66
115Verwimp 2013.
116Ibid.
117Straus 2006, 43; and Verwimp 2013.
118Prunier 1995, 225-9.
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Cultural Revolution in 1965-66, Mao both faced an alleged coup plot and was in open conflict
with his influential Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi,119 while Burundi had a rumored coup.120
Most of the cases that did not have coup events in the data do suggest severe competition
between factions within the regime at the start of the violence, such as Serbia/Yugoslavia,121
and Rwanda in 1964.122 Sudan,123 These illustrative cases suggest that the quantitative
models are correctly capturing elite rivalry: genocidal consolidation does indeed occur under
heightened elite rivalry.
Genocidal Consolidation and Elite Purges
Leaders are more likely to turn to genocidal consolidation during high elite rivalry, but do
they successfully purge elite rivals as part of the genocidal consolidation process? According
to the theory, the onset of non-counter-guerrilla mass violence should be followed by elite
purges (H2). As becomes clear from simple description and more sophisticated analysis,
results do indeed suggest a very strong relationship between Genocidal Consolidation—
operationalized as Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence (IV)—and Elite Purges (DV).
The descriptive Figure 3 contrasts the incidence of Elite Purges in Genocidal Consolida-
tion years to years without Genocidal Consolidation in a variety of reference categories and
is strongly suggestive of a relationship. Where Elite Purges occur in half of Genocidal Con-
solidation years, they occur in only 13.0% of other years, 11.4% of Counter-Guerrilla Mass
Violence years, and 23.2% of at-risk years. Even leaders that actually commit Genocidal
119Dittmer 1978; 1987.
120In Burundi, two rival Tutsi factions, Banyararuguru and Hima, vied for power in the 1970-1972 period,
with an alleged Banyaruguru coup plot late 1971. See Weinstein 1972; Lemarchand 2009.
121For example, in Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1990, the rivalry within the Communist party between Markovic’
reformist faction and Milosevic’ conservative faction turned salient as communist parties lost power
throughout Europe—e.g., Gagnon 2006, 89-94. In March 1991, anti-Milosevic protests and strikes di-
rectly threatened Milosevic’ position. In turn, Milosevic ordered the Yugoslav military to put down the
protests. Not only did the army refuse but Bieber suggests that it was preparing a coup that was aborted
because of lack of support from Markovic. Gagnon 2006, 103; and Bieber 2008, 323.
122In Rwanda in 1964, violence against Tutsi civilians was driven by intra-Hutu competition between the
Kayibanda’s Hutu faction and rival Hutus from Butare. See Barrington 2006, 86-89.
123In Sudan, Al-Bashir split with Al-Turabi before 2000, after which they competed for control until 2004.
Al-Turabi had his support coalition in the Darfur region. See De Waal 2007; Sørbø and Ahmed 2013.
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Consolidation have Elite Purges in only 3.5% of the years outside of Genocidal Consolida-
tion, which suggests that the correspondence of Elite Purges and Genocidal Consolidation
is unlikely to be driven by inherently violent leaders.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3: Incidence of Elite Purges during Genocidal Consolidation






























Similarly, the columns in Table 5 demonstrate a strong relationship between Genocidal
Consolidation in any given year and Elite Purges the following year. The first column shows
that when we pool Mass Indiscriminate Violence and do not distinguish between Counter-
Guerrilla Mass Violence and Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence, Mass Indiscriminate
Violence corresponds to Elite Purges. When we consider the type of mass indiscriminate
violence in column 2 of Table 5, however, it becomes clear that Genocidal Consolidation
corresponds to Elite Purges, while Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence does not. This provides
strong support for H2 and also demonstrates that genocidal consolidation significantly (at
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5% level) differs from Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence. Column 3 shows that the findings
are robust to dropping Militias from the analysis, which is only available from 1981.
[Table 5 about here]
The model presented in column 4 shows the preferred specification. While purges occur
in the later stages of the genocidal consolidation process, genocidal consolidation can occur
so rapidly that these purges cannot be reliably captured with one-year lags—e.g., in Rwanda
consolidation occurred within two weeks. Fortunately, because we know the exact timing
of purges and the mass violence onsets, we can precisely determine whether elite purges
occur before or in the year after the onset of mass violence.124 With a precise correction
for temporal order, the findings are, again, statistically significant and sizable. A median
non-democratic regime has a predicted probability of elite purges of 0.14 [CI 95%: .07; .24].
During, or shortly after, genocidal consolidation, however, a median authoritarian regime
has a predicted probability of elite purges of 0.59 [CI 95%: .43; .73], which is a statistically
significant increase in probability of .45 [CI 95%: .31; .58].
The analysis in column 4 demonstrates that elite purges occur at a higher rate during
genocidal consolidation than during other—less violent—times within countries that have,
or were likely to have, experienced mass violence. However, while this provides a straight-
forward interpretation of results as support for the relationship between elite rivalry and
genocidal consolidation, these regular authoritarian observations might potentially not be
representative of observations in which genocidal consolidation could occur. Therefore, col-
umn 5 repeats the analysis of column 4 with an at-risk sample to alleviate any selection
concerns: do elite purges occur at a higher rate during genocidal consolidation than at times
when genocidal consolidation is most likely?
Specifically, I first estimate the propensity of Genocidal Consolidation based on the spec-
ification of Model 1 of Table 4. I then select all observations for which the propensity of
both treated (Genocidal Consolidation) and control cases (no Genocidal Consolidation) is
124See Web Appendix D.1
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Table 5: Probit on Elite Purges for Genocidal Consolidation and Counter-Guerrilla
Mass Violence Spells
Probit analysis with robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†significant at 10%; ∗significant at 5%; ∗∗significant at 1%. Reported Pseudo R2 is McKelvey & Zavoina’s.
‡Precise temporal coding.
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greater than 0.01; this corresponds to roughly 10% of observations that are most at risk
of Genocidal Consolidation and similar on observables.125 As the propensity of genocidal
consolidation is based on high elite rivalry, column 5 effectively tests a stronger assumption:
that elite purges occur at a higher rate during genocidal consolidation than at other times
of high elite rivalry.
Nonetheless, results show that elite purges occur at a higher rate during genocidal consol-
idation than at high-risk times. Again, the findings are statistically significant and sizable.
A median at-risk non-democratic regime with a high propensity for Genocidal Consolidation
has a predicted probability of elite purges of 0.12 [CI 95%: .07; .24]. A median authoritarian
regime with similar propensity for Genocidal Consolidation has a predicted probability of
elite purges of 0.54 [CI 95%: .29; .78] during, or shortly after, Genocidal Consolidation.
This is a statistically significant increase in probability of .42 [CI 95%: .19; .65]. Results are
robust to the inclusion of Civil Conflict; the correction for unobserved heterogeneity using
random effects; and controlling for Horizontal Inequality.126 This relationship between mass
indiscriminate violence and purges of ingroup elites cannot be explained by rival explanations
and is strongly supportive of the theory of genocidal consolidation.
The purge of rival elites is part of the mass indiscriminate violence process in most cases of
indiscriminate violence that are expected to be instances of genocidal consolidation. As men-
tioned, genocidal consolidation in Rwanda took only two weeks: by then, General Gatsinzi
and the remainder of the reformist military command as well as all reformist prefects—high
ranking officials in control of regional security—had been purged from the regime.127 In
Cambodia, for example, Khmer elite were purged left and right during the mass killings.128
The most dangerous competitor to Pol Pot’s Khmer faction was the Vietnamese-trained
125Genocidal Consolidation observations in the at-risk sample have a similar incidence of Elite Purges as the
main sample: Elite Purges occur in 11 of the 23 Genocidal Consolidation observations.
126See Web Appendix D and G.3.
127Prunier 1995; Lanotte 2007.
128The long list of purged Khmer elites includes the leaders of five of the six Zones that together held the
political, economic, and military control of the country. It also included Deputy Prime Minister Vorn
Vet; Information Minister Hu Nim; and various Central Committee members and high-ranking military
commanders. Kiernan 2008.
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Khmer branch, which found its support base in the Eastern regions of the country. Early
attempts at purging this rival branch failed. Therefore, the Eastern regions were last to
be targeted with mass indiscriminate violence followed by purges of the Eastern Khmer
elites.129 In China, Collectivization, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution
led to the fall of Mao’s most influential rivals, such as regional leaders Gao Gang and Jao
Shu-Shih; General Peng Dehuai; and second-in-command Liu Shaoqi.130 Similar trends can
be observed in Yugoslavia/Serbia, Indonesia, and Nigeria.131 Even cases that did not have
conclusive evidence of elite purges, such as Rwanda in 1964 and Burundi in 1972, have con-
siderable circumstantial evidence of resolution of pre-existing rivalry and consolidation after
the violence.132 These short examples are illustrative of the quantitative findings. Non-
counter-guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence does indeed correspond to purges of ingroup
elites as predicted by the theory.
Genocidal Consolidation, Adverse Fates, and Irregular Removals
Leaders under conditions of high elite rivalry adopt genocidal consolidation to purge key elite
rivals, but does this strategy translate into greater odds of political and physical survival?
According to the theory, genocidal consolidation—operationalized as Non-Counter-Guerrilla
Mass Violence (IV)—should correspond to a reduced likelihood of adverse leader fates and
irregular removal (DV) originating from within the regime. In order to arrive at the ef-
fects of genocidal consolidation on leader survival, we need to account for selection effects.
Specifically, the theory of genocidal consolidation leads us to expect that those leaders that
experience the greatest risk of losing office are also the most likely to adopt genocidal consol-
129Most notably the Eastern Zone secretary So Phim and his support base. Kiernan 2008.
130E.g., see Dittmer 1987.
131In Serbia, the army staff that had opposed Milosevic at the breakdown of Yugoslavia was purged from
1991 until 1993, including Kadijevic; Adzic; Kukanjac; and Chief of Staff Panic. Burns 1992; Bieber
2008. In Indonesia, indiscriminate violence allowed Suharto to sideline his superior General Nasution and
remove Sukarno. E.g., Dake 2006. Similarly, following indiscriminate pogroms throughout Nigeria, Gowon
and Murtala Muhammed disposed of most of their fellow officers who had taken power in an earlier coup.
E.g., Siollun 2009.
132E.g., Lemarchand 1975; Barrington 2006.
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idation as a strategy to win elite rivalry. Consequently, it is not sufficient to simply estimate
the effects of genocidal consolidation on leader survival. Rather, we should approximate
the relevant counterfactual; are leaders that adopt genocidal consolidation more likely to
survive than their most similar counterparts that do not. To compare most similar leaders,
I match leader observations on the estimated propensity of initiating Non-Counter-Guerrilla
Mass Violence. The propensity score is estimated on observed covariates by regressing the
Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence Onset on GDP per Capita, Population, Polity, Tenure,
New Leader, Minor Purges, Irregular Conflict, and Rumored Coups.133
Results indicate that leaders who initiate genocidal consolidation indeed have a consid-
erably higher probability of survival than their most similar counterparts that do not. The
filled dots in Figure 4 represent the average treatment effect of genocidal consolidation on
adverse leader fates and irregular leader exits of leaders that adopt genocidal consolidation.
Positive coefficients correspond to an increased probability of adverse leader fates and irregu-
lar exits, while a negative coefficient corresponds to a reduced probability. The bars represent
the 95% confidence interval and tics represent the 90% confidence interval. The analyses in
Figure 4 are at the leader level in which genocidal consolidation leaders are matched to 50
most similar leaders within a propensity score range of .1 as counterfactuals.134 For each
leader in the control group only the year with the greatest predicted probability for genocidal
consolidation was used, based on the model presented in column 1 of Table 4 on page 32.
[Figure 4 about here]
With respect to adverse leader fates, Figure 4 demonstrates that leaders that adopt
genocidal consolidation do have a statistically significant reduced risk of Death or Impris-
onment.135 This supports the expectation that genocidal consolidation protects the leader
from the more acute dangers of elite rivalry. A sensitivity analysis reveals that these results
133E.g., see Sekhon 2009. See Web Appendix E for additional details.
134This resulted in an effective caliper of .005 at the tail of the propensity distribution and .097 at the center,
with a mean of 0.03 and a median of 0.02. Matches share common support; no matches are further than
0.005 outside the propensity range of treated variables. See Web Appendix E for additional details.
135Note that this only pertains to the successful initiation of genocidal consolidation.
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Figure 4: Average Treatment Effect of Genocidal Consolidation on Adverse Leader
Fates
Leaders matched to the 50 nearest neighbors on the estimated propensity score of initiating Non-Counter-Guerrilla Mass
Violence (based on GDP per Capita, Population, Polity, Tenure, New Leader, Minor Purges, Irregular Conflict, and
Rumored Coups) with a mean caliper range of 0.03 and a maximum caliper range of 0.097. N = 367; Treated = 10; and
Control = 357. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval; tics represent the 90% confidence interval.
are robust to unobserved covariates.136 At the same time, genocidal consolidation does not
significantly affect the risk of Exile—potentially because leaders exchange the more acute
internal threat for a lesser external threat. With respect to Irregular Exits, Figure 4 demon-
strates that leaders that adopt genocidal consolidation on average have a reduced risk of
Internal Irregular Exits—originating from within the regime.137 Leaders exchange this for
an increased, yet insignificant, risk of an External Irregular Exit—originating from outside
the regime. Though we cannot show that leaders initiate genocidal consolidation because
of within-group threats, these results do imply that those that do have an increased like-
lihood of survival. An additional robustness check with Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence
136At 95% confidence, to attribute the lower risk of Death (Γ 3.04) or Imprisonment (Γ 2.92) to an unobserved
covariate rather than to Genocidal Consolidation, that unobserved covariate would need to produce a
three-fold increase in the odds of Genocidal Consolidation and it would need to be a near perfect predictor
of Death or Imprisonment. Rosenbaum 2002.
137This falls just short of conventional significance and is only moderately robust to unobservables (Γ 1.48).
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as a placebo treatment—represented by the open dots in Figure 4—demonstrated no ef-
fects on Death, Imprisonment, or Internal Irregular Exits as expected. Leaders that initiate
Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence do have a reduced risk of both External Irregular Exits
that originate from outside the regime and corresponding Exile fates.138 As predicted, these
results indicate that leaders that adopt genocidal consolidation exchange the greater risks of
elite within-group competition for the lesser risks of between-group competition.
Upon close examination, leaders that initiate genocidal consolidation do successfully deal
with elite rivals. Even in cases such as Rwanda and Cambodia where leaders ultimately lost
power, they were ruthlessly successful against ingroup rivals; only after they had purged their
rivals within the regime, were they removed through military intervention originating from
outside. Moreover, because of the safer distant threat of military intervention as opposed
to the close threat of a coup, both Pol Pot’s regime as well as the genocidal Akazu regime
were able evade capture.139 Other leaders, such as Mao, Suharto, and Milosevic successfully
consolidated their power. Moreover, the neutralization of acutely critical ingroup rivalries
allowed Micombero, Amin, Gowon, Kayibanda, and Bashir to survive.
Conclusion
This paper explains cases of mass indiscriminate violence that occur outside of counter guer-
rilla campaigns as instances of genocidal consolidation. Building on new original data on
the type of mass indiscriminate violence and on elite purges, this study has established that:
1) genocidal consolidation is distinct from counter-guerrilla mass violence; 2) elite rivalry
corresponds to a greater likelihood of genocidal consolidation; 3) genocidal consolidation
corresponds to a greater probability of elite purges; and 4) leaders that successfully initi-
ate genocidal consolidation have a significantly reduced probability of adverse leader fates
such as death and imprisonment as well as of irregular removal through internal sources.
138Also see Web Appendix F.
139It took three years to capture some of the leading Akazu members and 20 years to capture Pol Pot’s inner
circle.
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Fortunately, genocidal consolidation is rare, which challenges us to base its understanding
on a relatively small body of evidence. Therefore, these quantitative findings by themselves
provide only partial evidence for the theory. However, taken together and in combination
with the qualitative trends, these findings suggest a robust relationship between elite rivalry
and mass violence and provide considerable support for the theory of genocidal consolidation
versus alternative explanations. Thereby supporting the proposition that genocidal consoli-
dation is instrumental to leader survival and suggesting that it should indeed be viewed as
part of a process of authoritarian competition.
Two broader observations follow with respect to the study of conflict and the emerging
field of authoritarian politics. First, as this study demonstrates, a key class of conflicts
cannot be examined as a bargaining problem between two actors. Especially in conflicts
in which authoritarian regimes seem to act irrationally violent and belligerent, the conflict
may be better explained by within-group competition and the benefits to leader survival
that the conflict may generate. Second, the study provides an initial answer to the question
how authoritarian leaders may consolidate power when they are least secure. This question
merits further attention as part of the emerging field of authoritarian politics and points
towards a strong connection between mass political violence and authoritarian politics.
By introducing a novel theory and a new piece of the mass violence puzzle, this study
also raises new questions. I believe three venues of research are particularly promising. First,
careful process tracing should determine whether established quantitative patterns consis-
tently hold within potential cases of genocidal consolidation. Second, elite rivalry is much
more common than genocidal consolidation. Therefore, disaggregate research into authori-
tarian support coalitions should further determine the conditions under which authoritarian
leaders that face elite rivalry adopt genocidal consolidation, interstate war, or alternative
strategies to strengthen their support coalitions and undermine those of their rivals.
Last, the potential interaction of elite rivalry and ideology merits further exploration.
While ideology and mass violence are undeniably connected, ideology remains difficult to
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pin down empirically. In light of theoretical parsimony, the genocidal consolidation theory
has been introduced as agnostic about the role of ideology. Instead, it provides a clear,
rational, explanation for seemingly irrational behavior that explicitly does not require ideo-
logically motivated leaders, elites, or perpetrators. However, it also explicitly doesn’t argue
that ideology is unimportant—on the contrary. Ideology could steer perpetrators, link perpe-
trators’ individual motives, or define the range of options open to elites, for example. Future
research into potential synergy of elite rivalry and ideology in producing mass violence is
therefore likely to be especially fruitful for our understanding of mass violence.
With respect to policy implications, there is reason for pessimism. Genocidal consoli-
dation occurs once a decade and, under conditions of deadly internal competition, it pays.
Therefore, we should likely expect more occurrences in the future. Moreover, genocidal
consolidation has previously occurred with relatively little warning, quick resolution, and
the highest number of civilian casualties. As noted before, genocidal consolidation alone
accounts for 8-11 million (civilian) deaths since 1945. A better understanding of the mech-
anisms underlying this particular type of violence would be a key step towards improving
early warning systems.
Here it should be noted that regimes in the process of genocidal consolidation might
be particularly vulnerable to outside intervention. Behind the scenes of genocidal consol-
idation, rival elites—as well as their supporters in the military, bureaucracy, and security
institutions—are fighting for survival. While ingroup elites cannot show open defection,
outside pressure may be secretly welcomed and lead the genocidal system to come crashing
down. The Rwandan military was remarkably passive against the RPF rebels during the
genocide as senior Hutu officers went into hiding. Similarly, there was little resistance to out-
side intervention in Uganda, Cambodia or Kosovo. Moreover, there is likely no moral hazard
for intervention140 in genocidal consolidation in particular; rebels cannot push governments
to genocidal consolidation in order to invite foreign intervention, because genocidal consol-
140See Kuperman 2008.
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idation is unrelated to rebel behavior. While, rapid outside intervention may be politically
or militarily unfeasible and may even expedite the killing, it should be seriously considered
in light of these findings. Ultimately, policy makers should design interventions that take
elite rivalry within the genocidal regime into account. In the case of genocidal consolidation,
interventions should not only resolve bargaining failures between groups, but consider the
strategic considerations of authoritarian elites as well.
In sum, genocidal consolidation may be rare, but comes at a high cost in life, even
when compared to other types of mass political violence. Violent episodes as diverse as that
of Stalin’s collectivization, the Cambodian killing fields, the disintegration of Yugoslavia,
and the Rwandan genocide have enduring consequences for security and economic develop-
ment. While additional research is necessary, results suggest that genocidal consolidation
is instrumental to win ingroup rivalry and intimately related to authoritarian competition.
Genocidal consolidation is therefore not driven by the random madness of leaders, nor by
the desire to kill an outgroup, but by the structural constraints and commitment problems
that authoritarian leaders face.
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